Consider: LBJ, Beauty & the Beast
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| He got The Job done. |
1. Intense and Manipulative “Treatment” Style
Johnson was infamous for his overwhelming persuasive tactics, dubbed “The Treatment” by journalists like Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. This involved invading personal space, bombarding targets with rapid-fire arguments, emotional outbursts (from tears to threats), and pulling out endless memos or clippings from his pockets—all while his eyes and eyebrows danced dramatically. It was described as a “gamut of human emotions” delivered at “breathtaking velocity,” leaving people exhausted and rarely able to interrupt. PBS historian Robert Dallek noted Johnson’s childhood-fueled “sense of emptiness,” driving his need for constant attention and control, which made interactions feel manic and invasive.
2. Vulgarity and Crude Personal Habits
LBJ’s lack of filter was legendary and off-putting. He reportedly nicknamed his penis “Jumbo” and would whirl it around in bathrooms while shouting boasts about its size. Biographer Robert Caro and aide Joseph Califano detailed how he frequently urinated in public (e.g., on airplane wheels) or demanded aides hold it for him during road trips. He groped female journalists, bragged about having men’s “pecker in my pocket” to assert dominance, and once lifted his beagle by the ears for a photo, calling it a “lesson in life.” These stories, corroborated in memoirs like Califano’s The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson, paint him as boorish and exhibitionistic, fueling views of him as a “truly awful man” despite his policy wins.
3. Paranoia and Perceived Mental Strain
By 1965, amid Vietnam escalation and domestic unrest, aides like Richard Goodwin (speechwriter for both JFK and LBJ) privately worried Johnson was “unhinged.” Goodwin’s memoir Remembering America describes a shift from “large eccentricities” to “paranoid behavior,” including obsessions with Robert F. Kennedy loyalists undermining him and wiretapping opponents like Barry Goldwater. During the 1968 Pueblo crisis (North Korea seizing a U.S. spy ship), Johnson briefly considered nuclear options before diplomacy prevailed. Goodwin wasn’t alone—Vice President Hubert Humphrey and others whispered about his mental state, though no formal intervention occurred. This era’s stress amplified his conspiratorial streak, making him seem irrational.
4. Reckless Decision-Making and War Escalation
Critics argue Johnson’s “reckless disregard for limits” extended to policy, mirroring his personal chaos. He escalated Vietnam troop levels from 16,000 to over 500,000 without a clear exit, ignoring advice to declare “victory and leave.” Domestically, his “Great Society” and “War on Poverty” launched ambitious (some say unrealistic) programs without rigorous planning, assuming willpower alone could eradicate issues. Historians like those on Reddit’s r/history forums often cite this as “arrogance” leading to failure, ruining his legacy and contributing to his 1968 decision not to run again.
Context and Nuance
Johnson wasn’t universally seen this way—defenders highlight his civil rights triumphs (e.g., the 1964 Civil Rights Act) as proof of pragmatic genius, arguing his “vulgar, impatient, devious” side was a tool for progress. Conspiracy theories (e.g., LBJ orchestrating JFK’s assassination) circulate online but lack credible evidence and are dismissed by mainstream historians. Ultimately, the “crazy” label endures because his larger-than-life flaws—amplified by Vietnam’s trauma—overshadow his achievements, as noted in outlets like The Week and Politico. For deeper reading, Robert Caro’s multi-volume biography The Years of Lyndon Johnson is the gold standard.
The “Treatment”
“The Treatment” was Lyndon B. Johnson’s infamous, intense method of persuasion, a psychological and physical tactic he used to dominate conversations and bend people—politicians, aides, journalists, even adversaries—to his will. It was less a formal strategy and more a visceral, almost theatrical display of his personality, blending charm, intimidation, emotional manipulation, and relentless argumentation. Described vividly by those who experienced it, it became a hallmark of his leadership style during his time as Senate Majority Leader (1955–1961) and President (1963–1969). Below are the key details, drawn from historical accounts and biographers like Robert Caro, Robert Dallek, and firsthand witnesses.
1. Core Characteristics of The Treatment
- Physical Intimidation: Johnson, at 6’4” with a commanding presence, used his size to overwhelm. He’d lean in close, sometimes inches from someone’s face, towering over them or grabbing their arm, lapel, or shoulder. Aides like George Reedy noted he’d “fill your space,” making escape impossible.
- Emotional Rollercoaster: The Treatment was a whirlwind of emotions—Johnson might shift from flattery to rage, humor to tears, within minutes. Journalist Rowland Evans described it as a “gamut of human emotions” at “breathtaking velocity,” leaving targets disoriented.
- Rapid-Fire Talking: He spoke nonstop, piling on arguments, anecdotes, and data, often pulling crumpled notes or clippings from his pockets to bolster his case. Recipients rarely got a word in, overwhelmed by the verbal barrage.
- Personalization: Johnson tailored his approach, exploiting what he knew about a person’s desires, fears, or weaknesses. He’d appeal to patriotism, personal loyalty, or self-interest, making it feel like a one-on-one bond.
- Duration and Setting: The Treatment could last minutes or hours, often in private settings like his Senate office, the Oval Office, or even a car or bathroom. He’d corner people in elevators or follow them to keep talking.
2. Purpose and Effectiveness
- Legislative Mastery: As Senate Majority Leader, Johnson used The Treatment to secure votes for bills, especially on contentious issues like civil rights. He’d target wavering senators, combining promises (e.g., federal projects for their state) with veiled threats (e.g., losing party support). Historian Robert Caro credits this for passing the 1957 Civil Rights Act, a landmark despite its watered-down form.
- Intimidating Opponents: During his presidency, he used it on everyone from foreign leaders to journalists. For example, he’d overwhelm skeptical reporters with data to shape favorable coverage of his Great Society programs.
- Building Loyalty: Johnson made aides and allies feel indispensable by showering them with praise during The Treatment, only to pivot to demands. Aide Joseph Califano recalled feeling both flattered and trapped.
3. Notable Examples
- Senators and Congressmen: Caro’s Master of the Senate recounts how Johnson used The Treatment on Southern Democrats like Richard Russell, mixing respect with pressure to sway their votes. He’d remind them of party loyalty or hint at political consequences.
- Journalists: Mary McGrory, a prominent reporter, described being “Johnsoned” when he cornered her for an hour, pleading for positive coverage while waving budget figures and invoking national duty.
- Foreign Leaders: During a 1965 meeting, he gave South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Cao Ky a milder version, using charm and promises of U.S. aid to secure alignment on Vietnam policy, per Dallek’s Flawed Giant.
4. Psychological Roots
Historians like Dallek argue The Treatment stemmed from Johnson’s insecurities and hunger for control, rooted in his childhood poverty and domineering mother. He craved approval but feared rejection, so he’d overwhelm others to ensure compliance. His aide Horace Busby noted Johnson’s “need to dominate” was both his strength and flaw, making The Treatment a tool to fill an “inner void.”
5. Perception and Legacy
- Effective but Exhausting: Allies admired its results but dreaded the experience. Senator Hubert Humphrey called it “like being caught in a Texas twister.” Opponents saw it as bullying, reinforcing Johnson’s image as manipulative.
- Amplifying the “Crazy” Label: The Treatment’s intensity fed perceptions of Johnson as erratic or unhinged, especially as Vietnam War stress amplified his paranoia. Aides like Richard Goodwin noted it became more aggressive by 1965–66.
- Cultural Depictions: It’s been dramatized in works like the 2016 film LBJ and HBO’s All the Way, showing Johnson cornering senators with a mix of charm and menace.
6. Limitations and Decline
- Not Universally Effective: Some, like Robert F. Kennedy, resisted The Treatment, finding it overbearing. RFK’s mutual dislike with LBJ made their meetings tense, per Caro.
- Vietnam Backlash: As public trust eroded during the Vietnam War, The Treatment lost potency. By 1968, Johnson’s persuasive magic couldn’t quell protests or media criticism.
- Personal Toll: Aides noted Johnson seemed drained by his own intensity, and his reliance on The Treatment waned as health issues (e.g., heart problems) and political isolation grew.
Lyndon B. Johnson’s persuasion tactics to pass landmark civil rights legislation, particularly the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, were a masterclass in political maneuvering, leveraging his signature “Treatment” alongside strategic coalition-building, emotional appeals, and pragmatic deal-making. As Senate Majority Leader (1955–1961) and President (1963–1969), LBJ used his deep understanding of Congress, personal relationships, and a mix of pressure and incentives to overcome fierce opposition, especially from Southern Democrats. Below is a detailed look at his tactics, grounded in historical accounts from biographers like Robert Caro, Robert Dallek, and primary sources from aides and legislators.
1. The Treatment: Personalized Pressure
Johnson’s intense, one-on-one persuasion method, “The Treatment,” was central to his civil rights strategy. He used it to sway key legislators, tailoring his approach to their motivations, fears, or ambitions.
- Physical and Emotional Intensity: Johnson would corner senators or congressmen, leaning in close, grabbing lapels, or locking eyes while delivering a rapid-fire mix of flattery, moral arguments, and threats. For example, he’d remind Southern senators of their party loyalty while warning of political isolation if they resisted.
- Targeting Key Figures: With Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), a segregationist leader, Johnson maintained a respectful but firm approach. Caro’s Master of the Senate details how LBJ, as Senate leader, spent hours with Russell, appealing to his patriotism and arguing.
Voting Rights Act of 1965
Lyndon B. Johnson’s persuasion tactics to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a landmark piece of legislation that outlawed discriminatory voting practices and transformed political participation for African Americans, were a masterclass in leveraging political capital, moral urgency, and his signature “Treatment” to navigate a deeply divided Congress. Building on the momentum of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Johnson used a combination of strategic timing, coalition-building, emotional appeals, and relentless pressure to secure its passage. Below is a detailed exploration of his tactics, drawing from historical accounts by biographers like Robert Caro, Robert Dallek, and firsthand sources from aides, legislators, and contemporary records.
Context of the Voting Rights Act
- Purpose: The Voting Rights Act aimed to eliminate barriers like literacy tests, poll taxes, and other discriminatory practices that prevented African Americans, particularly in the South, from voting. It followed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which addressed broader segregation but left voting rights enforcement weak.
- Catalyst: The brutal attacks on civil rights marchers during the Selma to Montgomery marches in early 1965, especially “Bloody Sunday” on March 7, 1965, at the Edmund Pettus Bridge, galvanized public and political support. TV footage of the violence shocked the nation, giving Johnson a window to act.
- Legislative Outcome: Signed into law on August 6, 1965, the Act banned discriminatory voting practices, authorized federal oversight of elections in areas with a history of discrimination (via Section 5), and empowered the Justice Department to enforce compliance.
LBJ’s Persuasion Tactics
Johnson’s approach combined his personal persuasive style, strategic use of public sentiment, and legislative mastery. Here’s how he did it:
1. Seizing the Moral Moment
- Selma as a Catalyst: Johnson capitalized on the public outrage over Bloody Sunday. On March 15, 1965, he delivered a televised address to a joint session of Congress, framing the Voting Rights Act as a moral imperative. His speech, written with aide Richard Goodwin, included the iconic line, “We shall overcome,” co-opting the civil rights movement’s anthem to align himself with its cause. This stunned even activists like Martin Luther King Jr., who reportedly wept.
- Moral Framing: Johnson cast voting rights as a fundamental American principle, saying, “It is wrong—deadly wrong—to deny any of your fellow Americans the right to vote.” This appealed to moderates and Northern liberals, making opposition seem unpatriotic.
- Public Pressure: He encouraged civil rights leaders to keep up demonstrations (within legal bounds) to maintain public focus, knowing media coverage would pressure Congress. As Dallek notes in Flawed Giant, Johnson told aides, “Every day while I’m in office, I’m going to lose votes,” but saw Selma’s momentum as a fleeting opportunity.
2. The Treatment in Action
Johnson deployed his intense, one-on-one persuasion tactic, “The Treatment,” to sway key legislators, particularly those on the fence or opposed.
- Targeting Southern Democrats: Southern senators like Richard Russell (D-GA) led the segregationist bloc. Johnson, a Texan with deep ties to Southern politicians, used personal relationships to soften their resistance. Caro’s Master of the Senate describes how LBJ avoided direct confrontation with Russell, instead appealing to his sense of history and inevitability: “Dick, I love you, but I don’t want you to be on the wrong side of this.” While Russell remained opposed, Johnson’s charm weakened the cohesion of the Southern bloc.
- Swaying Moderates: For moderate Republicans and Democrats, Johnson mixed flattery with pressure. He’d call senators to the Oval Office, lean in close, and recount stories of discrimination (often exaggerated for effect) while promising political rewards like federal projects. Aide Joseph Califano recalled Johnson telling wavering Democrats, “You vote for this, and your district will see a new hospital.”
- Relentless Follow-Ups: Johnson tracked votes meticulously, calling legislators at all hours. He’d wake aides like Larry O’Brien to check on specific congressmen, demanding, “What’s his price?” per O’Brien’s memoir.
3. Coalition-Building Across Party Lines
- Bipartisan Support: Johnson knew he needed Republicans to break Southern Democratic filibusters. He courted Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), a key swing vote. Dirksen, ambitious for a legacy, was flattered by Johnson’s attention—dinners, personal calls, and promises of input on the bill’s language. Dirksen’s support brought enough Republicans to secure a cloture vote (71-29 on June 10, 1965) to end the filibuster.
- Working with Civil Rights Leaders: Johnson coordinated with Martin Luther King Jr. and other activists, urging them to keep pressure on Congress through peaceful protests. He also used their moral authority to shame opponents, telling King privately, “You keep marching, and I’ll keep pushing,” per Dallek.
- Neutralizing Opponents: For die-hard segregationists like James Eastland (D-MS), Johnson didn’t waste energy on conversion but ensured they wouldn’t derail the process. He’d offer minor concessions (e.g., softening language on federal oversight) to avoid prolonged fights, knowing the bill’s core would survive.
4. Legislative Strategy and Timing
- Fast-Tracking the Bill: Johnson introduced the Voting Rights Act on March 17, 1965, just two days after his Selma speech, to ride the wave of public outrage. He pushed Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and House Speaker John McCormack to prioritize it, bypassing usual delays.
- Crafting a Strong Bill: Johnson worked with Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to draft a bill that was both enforceable and defensible in court. Section 5, requiring federal “preclearance” for voting changes in discriminatory jurisdictions, was a direct response to Southern tactics like gerrymandering. Johnson insisted on teeth, telling Katzenbach, “I want a bill that ends this forever.”
- Overcoming Filibusters: Anticipating Southern resistance, Johnson prepared for a Senate filibuster by ensuring enough votes for cloture. He tasked aides like Hubert Humphrey (his VP) with keeping liberal Democrats in line, while he personally lobbied Republicans.
5. Personal Investment and Risk
- Political Cost: Johnson knew supporting civil rights would alienate the South, costing Democrats votes for decades. He famously told aide Bill Moyers after signing the 1964 Act, “We’ve just lost the South for a generation.” Yet he saw voting rights as a moral and historical necessity, driven partly by his own experiences witnessing poverty and discrimination in Texas.
- Emotional Appeals: Johnson often invoked his time teaching Mexican-American children in Cotulla, Texas, in the 1920s, telling congressmen, “I saw kids who couldn’t vote, couldn’t dream, because the system crushed them.” This personal touch humanized his push, per Caro.
Key Outcomes and Impact
- Passage: The Voting Rights Act passed the Senate (77-19 on May 26, 1965) and House (333-85 on July 9, 1965), with strong bipartisan support. Johnson signed it on August 6, 1965, in the Capitol’s President’s Room, symbolically linking it to Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.
- Immediate Effects: Voter registration surged—e.g., in Mississippi, Black voter registration rose from 6.7% in 1964 to 59.8% by 1967. Federal examiners and poll watchers enforced compliance in Southern states.
- Legacy: The Act transformed American politics, enabling millions of African Americans to vote and elect representatives. It’s considered one of LBJ’s greatest achievements, though later weakened by Supreme Court decisions like Shelby County v. Holder (2013).
Challenges and Opposition
- Southern Resistance: Senators like Strom Thurmond (D-SC) and James Eastland filibustered, arguing the bill violated states’ rights. Johnson countered by keeping public attention on Selma’s violence, making opposition politically toxic.
- Balancing Act: Some liberals wanted a stronger bill (e.g., banning poll taxes outright), but Johnson accepted compromises to ensure passage, knowing courts could address gaps later.
- Personal Strain: The effort exhausted Johnson, who was juggling Vietnam and Great Society programs. Aides noted his growing paranoia about opposition, though his focus on voting rights remained sharp.
Sources and Further Reading
- Robert Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate: Details LBJ’s Senate tactics and relationships with Southerners like Russell.
- Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Analyzes Johnson’s presidency and civil rights strategy, including his use of Selma’s momentum.
- Joseph Califano, The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: Insider account of LBJ’s persuasive tactics and legislative push.
- Congressional Records: The March 15, 1965, speech and Senate debates (available via Library of Congress) show Johnson’s rhetoric and the opposition’s arguments.
- PBS and The Week: Contemporary analyses of LBJ’s civil rights legacy, emphasizing his moral and political calculations.
Conclusion
The Treatment was LBJ’s signature weapon, a blend of charisma, aggression, and strategy that defined his political genius but also underscored his polarizing, larger-than-life persona.
Johnson’s persuasion for the Voting Rights Act was a blend of moral urgency, relentless personal pressure via The Treatment, bipartisan coalition-building, and strategic timing. He turned Selma’s tragedy into a legislative triumph, knowing the political cost but prioritizing a historic expansion of democracy.
Sources and Further Reading
- Robert Caro’s The Years of Lyndon Johnson (especially Master of the Senate): Detailed accounts of The Treatment in action, with vivid anecdotes from senators and aides.
- Robert Dallek’s Lyndon Johnson and His Times: Analyzes its psychological roots and political impact.
- Memoirs: Joseph Califano’s The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson and George Reedy’s Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir offer insider perspectives.
- Journalistic Accounts: Evans and Novak’s 1966 book Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power coined the term “The Treatment” publicly.
